Unnecessary Roughness: Why the NCAA’s Heavy-Handed Amateurism Rules Violate the Sherman Antitrust Act by Shaver, Stephen
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 48 New Directions in Community Lawyering, Social Entrepreneurship, and Dispute 
Resolution 
2015 
Unnecessary Roughness: Why the NCAA’s Heavy-Handed 
Amateurism Rules Violate the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Stephen Shaver 
Washington University of St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Litigation Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen Shaver, Unnecessary Roughness: Why the NCAA’s Heavy-Handed Amateurism Rules Violate the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, 48 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 347 (2015), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/17 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
347 
Unnecessary Roughness: Why the NCAA’s  
Heavy-Handed Amateurism Rules Violate  
the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Stephen Shaver 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1939, the University of Pittsburgh reduced the subsidies it paid 
to football players, putting freshmen on a lower salary scale than 
upperclassmen.
1
 The freshman football players responded to the 
subsidy reduction by going on strike for the beginning of the 1939 
season.
2
 Inspired by a wave of strikes sweeping through the steel and 
automobile industries, they successfully shamed the university’s 
administration into restoring their subsidies.
3
  
Such a strike would be unthinkable today. College athletics 
currently operates under the pretense of amateurism.
4
 The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the organization that 
currently oversees college athletics, maintains strict rules to ensure 
that college athletes remain “amateurs” rather than “professionals.” 
However, despite a 432-page manual of regulations regarding 
 
 1. JOHN SAYLE WATTERSON, COLLEGE FOOTBALL: HISTORY, SPECTACLE, 
CONTROVERSY 189 (2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The modern conception of amateurism in sport has its roots in a Victorian-era 
misunderstanding that ancient Greek athletes, including the original Olympic athletes, 
competed for no financial gain or prize. Kate Buford, Amateurism and Jim Thorpe at the Fifth 
Olympiad, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST., http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-
era/politics-reform/essays/amateurism-and-jim-thorpe-fifth-olympiad (last visited Feb. 18, 
2015). In the Victorian era, amateurism served as a barrier to keep the lower classes out of 
sports because only those of independent means could afford to compete without pay. Id. See 
John J. Sewart, The Meaning of Amateurism, 2 SOC. OF SPORT J. 77 (1985), available at 
http://journals.humankinetics.com/AcuCustom/Sitename/Documents/DocumentItem/9208.pdf, 
for a different perspective, defending an amateur ideal of “pure sport.” 
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amateurism, the NCAA never defines the concept.
5
 Rather, it treats 
amateurism as a nebulous status that exists short of a threshold of 
professionalism, a status that is lost the instant that threshold is 
crossed.
6
 Those 432 pages list the various ways in which a college 
athlete can cross the threshold of professionalism, compromise his 
amateur status, and bring punishments on himself and his institution.
7
 
Pursuant to the NCAA manual, a college athlete may not receive 
any payment or other benefit from any party in return for his
8
 
participation in athletics, save his scholarship.
9
 He may not utilize an 
agent to advise him or provide representation in the complex 
decisions affecting his athletic career.
10
 He may not license his name, 
 
 5. See generally NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2013–14 NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL (July 2013) available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/usc/genrel/ 
auto_pdf/2013-14/misc_non_event/ncaa-manual.pdf [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. The closest 
the manual comes to defining amateurism is that student-athletes’ participation in 
intercollegiate athletics “should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, 
mental and social benefits to be derived.” Id. at 4 (Rule 2.9). The manual goes on to discuss the 
plethora of ways in which amateur status can be lost. Id. at 59 (rule 12.1.2). These provide 
rough boundaries of the NCAA conception of “amateurism;” however, the NCAA provides no 
core definition of amateurism from which these boundaries may be derived. Perhaps the NCAA 
is facing the same difficulty that Avery Brundage, former head of the International Olympic 
Committee and staunch defender of amateurism, faced in 1960 when he remarked 
“[amateurism] is a thing of the spirit, and hence is very difficult to define.” Patrick Hruby, The 
Olympics Show Why College Sports Should Give Up on Amateurism, ATLANTIC (July 25, 
2012, 8:01 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/07/the-olympics-
show-why-college-sports-should-give-up-on-amateurism/260275/. 
 6. See 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL supra note 5, at 59 (Rule 12.1.2). 
Ostensibly, the NCAA claims that student-athletes must remain amateurs to ensure that 
intercollegiate athletics remain a part of their educational experience. Id. at xiv. However, as 
this Note will discuss, the investments in and revenues generated by the athletic programs in a 
class of major universities indicate that athletics at these universities have moved beyond being 
mere components of the academic programs and educational purposes of the university. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Although for brevity I will use the male pronoun, the NCAA amateurism restrictions 
and their accompanying legal issues apply to female athletes as well.  
 9. Id. at 59 (Rule 12.1.2.1). Examples of what is forbidden range from the decadent, see, 
e.g., Cam Newton Scandal: Rep Sought Cash from MSU, CBS NEWS, (Nov. 5, 2010, 8:34 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cam-newton-scandal-rep-sought-cash-from-msu, discussing an 
offer to pay Cam Newton $180,000 to play for Mississippi State University, to the petty, see, 
e.g., NCAA Approves Unlimited Free Meals: Bagels with Cream Cheese All Day Every Day, 
SB NATION (Apr. 15, 2014, 9:31 PM), http://www.thedailygopher.com/2014/4/15/5618902/ 
ncaa-approves-unlimited-free-meals-bagels-with-cream-cheese-all-day, noting that, until recently, 
universities were permitted to give athletes bagels, but providing cream cheese was a violation. 
 10. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 59 (Rule 12.1.2(g)).  
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image, or likeness;
11
 instead he must forfeit his right to publicity to 
the NCAA. Each of these regulations is highly restrictive of college 
athletes. 
The NCAA’s power to enforce these regulations comes from the 
consent of its member institutions and its control over certain 
television contracts to broadcast games and other content. The NCAA 
is an unincorporated organization of approximately 1,200 members, 
including “virtually all public and private universities and four-year 
colleges conducting major athletic programs in the United States.”12 
Antitrust plaintiffs and economists alike have accused the NCAA and 
its members of acting like a “cartel” and conspiring to deny 
compensation to college athletes for their labor.
13
  
The NCAA posted revenues of nearly $872 million in fiscal year 
2012 and maintains $530 million in unrestricted assets, much of it 
from selling television-licensing rights to the NCAA basketball 
tournament every spring.
14
 Major schools and conferences also sell 
the right to broadcast their football and men’s basketball games for 
hundreds of millions of dollars.
15
 But not every collegiate athletic 
 
 11. Id. at 12 (Rule 3.2.4.18). 
 12. NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 462 (1999). A few other college athletic associations 
currently operate in the United States as well, though none do so on the scale or with the 
notoriety of the NCAA. The most well known of these associations is the National Association 
of Intercollegiate Athletics, with about 300 member institutions and a $6 million annual 
operating budget. Michael Braude, NAIA Scores a Win with Carr’s Effective Leadership as 
CEO, KANSAS CITY BUSINESS JOURNAL (Dec. 24, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals. 
com/kansascity/print-edition/2010/12/24/naia-scores-a-win-with-carrs.html. 
 13. Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 356, In re Student-Athlete 
Name and Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013), 2013 WL 
3810438 [hereinafter Class Action Complaint]; see also Robert Barro, The Best Little Monopoly 
in America, BUS. WK., Dec. 9, 2002, at 22, available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/files/ 
02_1209_monopoly_bw.pdf (“[T]he NCAA is the clear choice for best monopoly in 
America.”); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing plaintiff’s 
allegations that NCAA eligibility rules constitute price-fixing, cases discussed in more detail 
below).  
 14. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA had Record $71 Million Surplus in Fiscal 2012, USA 
TODAY (May 2, 2013, 8:58 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/ 2013/05/02/ 
ncaa-financial-statement-surplus/2128431/. 
 15. Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 11:43 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2011/12/22/college-footballs-most-valuable-teams/. 
While the NCAA profits most from licensing the NCAA Tournament, there are also licensing 
rights to regular season games, bowl games, the College Football Playoff, and other non-NCAA 
tournaments. These rights are divvied up between the various schools, conferences, and 
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department turns a high profit, let alone any profit at all; most operate 
at a financial loss to their university.
16
 Notably, however, those 
schools that report large revenues license the broadcast rights to their 
games for millions of dollars.
17
 Further, the athletes at these schools 
stimulate the sale of jerseys and other memorabilia,
18
 and are 
depicted (allegedly)
19
 in videos games based on college sports. Yet 
college athletes are barred from receiving any compensation relating 
to their athletic performance or the use of their name and likeness. 
Many college athletes have challenged these eligibility rules under 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.
20
 Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 
the late nineteenth century to protect competition and combat the 
dangers of monopolies.
21
 The plaintiffs in these cases have alleged 
 
associations and then sold to broadcasters. The intricacies of these deals are interesting, but 
beyond the scope of this Note.  
 16. See Steve Berkowitz et al., Most NCAA Division I Athletic Departments Take 
Subsidies, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ 
college/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/ 
 17. See Smith, supra note 15. 
 18. Amid accusations that it made money off of student-athletes, the NCAA stopped 
selling jerseys altogether in 2013. Bill Chappell, NCAA Will Stop Selling Player Jerseys, Takes 
Web Shop Down, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 9, 2013, 5:16 P.M.) http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
thetwo-way/2013/08/09/210566486/ncaa-will-stop-selling-player-jerseys-takes-web-shop-down. 
Many schools, however, still sell jerseys with numbers that coincidentally happen to match the 
numbers of their star players. Jason Kirk, NCAA President Faces Fact that Colleges Sell 
Jerseys with Real Player Numbers, SB NATION (June 20, 2014, 12:20 PM) http://www. 
sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/20/5827802/ncaa-player-jerseys-numbers-mark-emmert-
obannon. 
 19. This is at issue in the O’Bannon case. The plaintiffs allege that virtually every real-life 
Division I football or basketball player in the NCAA has a corresponding player in video games 
produced by Electronic Arts (EA) with the same jersey number, along with virtually identical 
height, weight, build, and home state. In addition, EA matches the player’s skin tone, hair color, 
and often even a player’s hairstyle. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 269.  
 20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004). See generally McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (challenging NCAA rule placing limits on compensation to players); Banks v. 
NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1992) (challenging NCAA rule prohibiting college 
athletes from entering professional drafts or using agents); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 181 
(3d Cir. 1998) (challenging NCAA rule placing restrictions on post-baccalaureate participation 
in intercollegiate athletics); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 
1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (challenging NCAA rule limiting number of scholarships per team); 
Agnew v, NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012) (challenging NCAA rule prohibiting multi-year 
scholarships, limiting number of scholarships per team). 
 21. See Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. United Motion Picture Theatre Owners of E. Penn., S. 
N.J. and Del., 93 F.2d 714, 719 (3d Cir. 1937) (“Congress in passing the anti-trust acts intended 
to free interstate commerce from the evils produced by combinations and conspiracies of all 
kinds.”). 
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that many of the NCAA’s eligibility rules are illegal restraints of 
trade.
22
 The most recent challenge, brought by Ed O’Bannon, a 
former University of California Los Angeles basketball player, and 
Sam Keller, a former Arizona State University football player, was 
recently decided in the Northern District of California.
23
 Several 
current and former college athletes joined Keller and O’Bannon as 
plaintiffs in the suit against the NCAA, its marketing wing the 
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC), and Electronic Arts (EA).
24
 
They alleged that these entities (1) illegally establish as zero the price 
at which college athletes sell the rights in perpetuity to their image 
and likeness and (2) refused to deal with former college athletes 
regarding compensation for the use of their image and likeness after 
they graduated.
25
  
Historically in antitrust cases against it, the NCAA has relied on 
amateurism as a procompetitive justification for its actions.
26
 The 
theory is that amateurism is an essential aspect of college athletics 
that differentiates college athletics from professional athletics and 
preserves college athletics as a unique product.
27
 Essentially, the 
NCAA is allowed to fix prices in the input market (the market for the 
services of student-athletes) in order to preserve the character of its 
product in the output market (the market for college sports). The 
NCAA relied on amateurism at trial in the O’Bannon case, and will 
likely do so again on appeal.
28
  
 
 22. See, e.g., McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1338; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1088; Smith, 139 F.3d at 
184; Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1147; Agnew, 683 F.3d at 334. 
 23. In re Student-Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2013 
WL 5979327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013), decided sub nom. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) [hereinafter O’Bannon]. 
 24. EA and CLC have since settled with the plaintiffs, leaving the NCAA as the only 
defendant to the suit. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class Certification 
at *1 n.1, In re Student-Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litig., (No. C 09-01967 CW), 
2013 WL 5979327 at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov 8 2013). 
 25. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 552–57. 
 26. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984), 
McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344–45; Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089–91; Walk-On Football Players 
Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1147–50; Agnew, 683 F.3d at 342-6. 
 27. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344-45 (“The NCAA markets college football as a product 
distinct from professional football. The eligibility rules create the product and allow its survival 
in the face of commercializing pressures.”). 
 28. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955. 
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Regardless of the outcome of that appeal, amateurism is no longer 
viable as a procompetitive justification for the NCAA’s eligibility 
rules because (1) college sports are not in fact amateur, (2) there are 
less restrictive alternatives, and (3) in any event, amateurism is not 
procompetitive as the NCAA claims. Part II will examine American 
antitrust law, describe the history of amateurism and the NCAA, and 
explore how the NCAA has survived within the framework of 
American antitrust law. Part III will analyze the NCAA’s proffered 
procompetitive justification of amateurism against the current state of 
college athletics. Part IV will propose that amateurism can no longer 
justify the NCAA’s restraints of trade and protect it from antitrust 
liability. Section V will conclude the whether the NCAA voluntarily 
relaxes the amateurism rules or a federal court forces the issue, the 
NCAA’s heavy-handed regulation of the amateur status of college 
athletes is likely to come to an end. 
II. HISTORY 
Under Section One of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”29 The 
Sherman Act seeks to protect consumers from injury that results from 
diminished competition.
30
 A lack of competition in a given market 
leads to higher prices and fewer choices for consumers, harming both 
the market and individual consumers. Thus, an antitrust plaintiff must 
allege both an injury to himself and an injury to the market.
31
 A 
plaintiff must prove three elements to succeed under Section One of 
the Sherman Act: “(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) a 
resultant unreasonable restraint of trade in [a] relevant market; and 
(3) an accompanying injury.”32 Because all NCAA member schools 
have agreed to abide by the NCAA bylaws, the first prong, 
 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2002). 
 30. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1087 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 
1107–08 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 31. Car Carriers, Inc., 745 F.2d at 1107. 
 32. Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir.1993) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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demonstrating an agreement or contract, is not at issue in NCAA 
antitrust cases.
33
 
The Sherman Act seeks to protect the benefits of competition: 
lower prices and more choices for consumers.
34
 Therefore, the 
determination of whether a restraint is unreasonable focuses on the 
competitive effects of the challenged restraint weighed against less 
restrictive alternatives or the abandonment of the restraint 
altogether.
35
 Courts have established three categories of review—the 
Rule of Reason, the Per Se framework, and the “quick-look” 
analysis—for determining whether actions have anticompetitive 
effects, though the methods often blend together.
36
 All three methods 
of analysis seek to answer the same question—whether the 
challenged restraint enhances competition.
37
 
The Rule of Reason is the standard framework for analyzing an 
action’s anticompetitive effects on a market.38 Under a Rule of 
Reason analysis, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that an 
agreement or contract has an anticompetitive effect on a given market 
within a given geographic area.
39
 First, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant has market power—that is, the ability to raise prices 
significantly (whether as a monopolist acting alone or as a group of 
competitors acting in concert) but avoid going out of business—
without which the defendant could not cause anticompetitive effects 
on market pricing.
40
 If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant 
must show that the restraint in question actually has procompetitive 
 
 33. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (“There is no question that all 
NCAA member schools have agreed to abide by the Bylaws; the first showing of an agreement 
or contract is therefore not at issue in this case.”). 
 34. Id. at 334–35 (“The purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect consumers from injury 
that results from diminished competition.”). 
 35. 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1500 (1986). 
 36. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The truth is that our categories 
of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and 
‘Rule of Reason’ tend to make them appear.”); see also United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 
658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 37. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 100 (1984)). 
 38. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335. 
 39. See Reifert v. S. Cent. Wis. MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312, 321 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 40. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 822 F.3d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1987).  
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benefits that outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
41
 The plaintiff then 
must either dispute this claim or show that the restraint in question is 
not reasonably necessary to achieve the procompetitive objective.
42
 
The alleged restraint is unreasonable if there are less restrictive 
means that achieve the same procompetitive benefits without harming 
competition.
43
 
The second category of analysis utilized by courts, the Per Se 
framework, is employed when a “practice facially appears to be one 
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and 
decrease output.”44 Restraints that would fall under this category are 
illegal as a matter of law for reasons of efficiency; in essence, it is 
simply not worth the effort or resources required by a Rule of Reason 
analysis when “the Court [can] predict with confidence that the Rule 
of Reason will condemn [a restraint].”45 Under the Per Se framework, 
a restraint is deemed unreasonable without any inquiry into the 
market context in which the restraint operates.
46
 The two classic 
examples of behavior that is considered anticompetitive per se are 
horizontal price-fixing (an agreement between competitors or an 
action by a monopolist to set the price of a product) and output 
limitation (an agreement between competitors or an action by a 
monopolist to artificially limit the amount of product brought to 
market).
47
  
 
 41. Social policy or public welfare concerns may not be weighed in the analysis; only 
economic arguments are allowed. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
693-94 (1978) (concluding argument that restraint on competition “ultimately inures to the 
public benefit” does not satisfy the Rule of Reason). Therefore, merely arguing that the system 
of NCAA regulations is unfair to college athletes would be pointless. A fairness or social policy 
argument is relevant to an antitrust analysis only if it is repackaged as an argument that the 
restraint creates a new product that would not otherwise be available. See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 
at 677. 
 42. AREEDA, supra note 35, ¶ 1507b. 
 43. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994) (“One basic tenet of the rule of 
reason is that a given restriction is not reasonable, that is, its benefits cannot outweigh its harm 
to competition, if a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to the policy exists that would provide 
the same benefits as the current restraint.”). 
 44. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (quoting Broad. 
Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)). 
 45. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) (quoting Arizona 
v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)). 
 46. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 100. 
 47. Id. 
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The third category, the “quick look” analysis, falls in the grey area 
between the Per Se framework and the full-blown Rule of Reason 
analysis. The “quick look” analysis is appropriate when a restraint 
would normally be considered illegal per se, but “a certain degree of 
cooperation is necessary if the [product at issue] is to be preserved.”48 
Under this approach, if the court finds no legitimate justifications for 
facially anticompetitive behavior (such as price-fixing), no market 
power analysis is necessary and the court “condemns the practice 
without ado.”49 But if it finds justifications, the court may need to 
apply a full Rule of Reason analysis.
50
 
The NCAA’s restraints of trade are analyzed under the Rule of 
Reason because intercollegiate athletic competition is “an industry in 
which horizontal restraints [agreements between parties at the same 
level of a market or industry] on competition are essential if the 
product [in this case, college sports] is to be available at all.”51 For 
example, schools must agree on the size of fields, the rules of 
gameplay, and the length of games if any intercollegiate games are to 
be played, much less broadcasted. Therefore, the evaluation of the 
competitive character of the NCAA’s horizontal restraints of trade, 
that would normally be per se illegal, require consideration of the 
NCAA’s justifications for the restraints.52 Some mutual agreements 
between member schools, like those on the field size and rules of 
gameplay,
53
 are easily justified because the product would not exist 
without them. Other agreements, like the amateurism restraints,
54
 are 
less easy to justify. 
The NCAA’s restraints on trade first failed a Rule of Reason 
analysis in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma.
55
 In Regents, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA’s 
limit on the number of football games a university could broadcast 
 
 48. Id. at 117; see also 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1911c (1998). 
 49.  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992).   
 50. See id.  
 51. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101. 
 52. Id. at 103. 
 53. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2014 NCAA FOOTBALL RULES 
AND INTERPRETATIONS (July 2014), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/product 
downloads/FR14.pdf. 
 54. See supra notes 6–11. 
 55. 468 U.S. at 133–36. 
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per year was an unreasonable restraint of trade, because it existed 
only to insulate ticket sales from competition.
56
 In those days, the 
NCAA believed that no one would come to games if they could 
simply watch them on television and thus limited the number of 
games an institution could broadcast.
57
 The Court found that the rule 
did nothing to preserve the product of college football; instead, it 
“simply impose[d] a restriction on one source of revenue that [was] 
more important to some colleges than to others.”58 Regents 
established, for the first time, that an action of the NCAA could be an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. 
Regents is significant for another reason. In addition to ruling that 
the NCAA could not restrict the number of college football games 
available for broadcast,
59
 the Court also spoke in dicta about the 
rationale behind the numerous restraints that allegedly keep college 
athletics amateur.
60
 These few lines of dicta have haunted antitrust 
plaintiffs for decades: 
“[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—
college football. The identification of this ‘product’ with an 
academic tradition differentiates college football from and 
makes it more popular than professional sports to which it 
might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor 
league baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality 
of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to 
attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the ‘product’ 
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an 
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its 
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon 
be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling 
 
 56. Id. at 117. The NCAA began restricting television broadcasts of football games in 
1951. In 1979, schools with major football programs, among them the University of Oklahoma, 
began to agitate for a greater voice in formulating the NCAA’s football broadcast policy and for 
more televised games. At issue in this case was the NCAA broadcast plan for the 1982–85 
seasons, under which no school was allowed to appear on television more than a total of six 
times total and no more than four times nationally per two-year period. Id. at 89–95.  
 57. Id. at 115–16. 
 58. Id. at 119. 
 59. Id. at 119–20.  
 60. Id. at 101–02 
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college football to preserve its character, and as a result 
enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be 
unavailable.”61 
These lines do not contribute to the holding of Regents. Rather, they 
explain how amateurism serves as the primary procompetitive 
justification for the mutual agreements between the NCAA and its 
member schools to restrain trade because it preserves college 
athletics as a distinct product. 
After Regents, college athletes began to bring antitrust suits 
challenging the amateurism restraints. The first of these suits 
challenged the limits on compensation that may be paid to college 
athletes.
62
 In McCormack v. NCAA, the plaintiffs argued that these 
limits constituted illegal price-fixing by a cartel of buyers.
63
 The 
court deferred to the previously-cited dicta in Regents and found that 
the limits on compensation “create[d] the product and allow[ed] its 
survival in the face of commercializing pressures.”64 It quickly 
upheld the NCAA’s restraints as reasonable, adding that NCAA 
restraints could be reasonable even where the restraint promoted 
something less than a perfect form of amateurism.
65
 
The NCAA also prohibits college athletes from testing the waters 
of the professional leagues. An athlete unsuccessfully challenged this 
no-draft rule as an illegal restraint of trade in Banks v. NCAA.
66
 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 63. Id. at 1342–43. This case was spawned by the infamous “death penalty” suspension of 
the Southern Methodist University football program for the entire 1987 season. Holding SMU 
football responsible for multiple NCAA rule violations, most notably compensating football 
players beyond what was allowed under NCAA restrictions, the NCAA suspended the program 
for the entire 1987 season and imposed other penalties. Id. at 1340. 
 64. Id. at 1345. 
 65. Id. A restraint could still be reasonable even where the NCAA had not “distilled 
amateurism to its purest form.” Id. 
 66. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit agreed 
with the District Court’s grant of the NCAA’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff failed 
to allege that the restraint had any anticompetitive effect. Id. at 1086. The dissent, however, 
reasoned that the restraint did have an anticompetitive effect because the no-draft rule limited 
the package of “terms of employment” which a university could offer to an athlete to attract 
him to that school. Id. at 1095. These “terms of employment,” on which schools compete to 
attract athletes, include tuition, room and board, institutional reputation, and academic 
programs. Id. at 1096. The dissent reasoned that the restraint eliminated competition between 
schools on this particular term and thus had an anticompetitive effect. The dissent noted what 
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However, the NCAA has recently added a number of broad 
exceptions to this rule that swallow much of what was once 
impermissible conduct.
67
  
The most recent effort to challenge the NCAA amateurism rules 
using the antitrust laws is the O’Bannon case discussed above.68 The 
plaintiffs accused the NCAA and its business partners of denying 
them payment for selling the rights to their image and likeness (by 
fixing the price to zero) and refusing to deal with former athletes 
regarding compensation for the continued use of their image and 
likeness after they graduate.
69
 A federal trial judge agreed in principal 
with the plaintiffs, but issued a piecemeal and logically inconsistent 
injunction.
70
 The NCAA’s appeal is currently before the Ninth 
Circuit.
71
 
The ban on agents is another core tenant of amateurism that, 
according to the NCAA, preserves the unique character of its product, 
college athletics.
72
 In theory, no agent can contact a professional 
sports team on behalf of a player or steer a player toward a particular 
school.
73
 However, the NCAA looks the other way with regard to 
 
would happen if college athletics abandoned the no-draft rule: “[C]olleges that promised their 
athlete the opportunity to test the waters in the NFL draft before their eligibility expired, and 
returned if things didn’t work out, would be more attractive to athletes than colleges that 
declined to offer the same opportunity.” Id. at 1095. 
 67. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 65–66 (Rule 12.4.2). These exceptions allow an 
athlete to enter a professional draft one time in his or her college career without jeopardizing his 
or her eligibility provided that (1) the athlete is not drafted, and (2) the athlete declares, in 
writing and within a certain amount of time after the draft, his or her intention to resume 
intercollegiate competition. Id. 
 68. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 69. Class Action Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 552–57. 
 70. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963. The court enjoined the NCAA from enforcing any 
rules or bylaws that would prohibit its member schools and conferences from offering their 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) football or Division I basketball recruits a limited share of the 
revenues generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses. Id. at 1007-08. 
However, the court allowed the NCAA to cap this amount at the cost of attendance as defined 
by NCAA bylaws ($5000 in 2014). Id. at 1008. It is difficult to fathom how price-fixing at $0 is 
a violation of the per se rule against price-fixing, but price-fixing at $5000 is not. 
 71. Steve Berkowitz, Court to Expedite NCAA’s Appeal of the Ed O’Bannon Lawsuit, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ college/2014/ 
09/24/ncaa-lawsuit-case-appeal-ed-obannon-expedited-peter-shaw/16154997/. 
 72. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 59, 66. 
 73. Joe Nocera, The Hockey Exemption, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/02/14/opinion/nocera-the-hockey-exemption.html?_r=0. 
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college hockey.
74
 Talented young hockey players have a plethora of 
future options; by their mid-teens, they can join an extensive system 
of junior leagues and farm teams.
75
 By nineteen, they also have to 
choose whether to play for a college and which college, and become 
eligible for the professional draft.
76
 At this juncture in their careers, 
many young hockey players utilize professional agents, called 
advisors, for advice and assistance in contract negotiation.
77
 The 
system appears to work well for everyone involved, and the NCAA 
“averts its eyes” from this systemic violation of its rules.78 There are 
many reasons for the hockey exemption. First, the complex nature of 
the decisions facing young players often requires the counsel of an 
experienced advocate.
79
 Second, the players who choose to play in 
college and subject themselves to the NCAA’s rules often do so 
because they have been advised that it is their best route to the 
professional league.
80
 Third, the system is so ingrained in hockey 
culture that it would be exceedingly difficult for the NCAA to 
dismantle it.
81
 Fourth, one can speculate that, because college hockey 
is not a big-revenue sport, should college hockey players ever be 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. See also Chris Peters, A Beginner’s Guide to the CHL vs. NCAA Recruiting Battle, 
THE UNITED STATES OF HOCKEY (July 18, 2012) http://unitedstatesofhockey.com/ 2012/07/18/ 
a-beginners-guide-to-the-chl-vs-ncaa-recruiting-battle/ (Describing the differences between 
NCAA hockey and its primary competitor, the Canadian Hockey League (CHL), their 
competition for recruits, and their success at sending players to the National Hockey Leauge 
(NHL). “There isn’t a comparable sport [to college hockey] in college athletics where there is 
direct competition for the same players by an outside entity.”). 
 76. Nocera, supra note 73. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. The landscape facing a teenage hockey player is a complex one. By their mid-
teens, good hockey players have the option to join various junior leagues of varying levels in 
both the United States and abroad. Id. The primary league that competes with NCAA Hockey is 
the CHL, which plays an NHL-like schedule and has produced a high volume of NHL players. 
Peters, supra note 75. At nineteen years old, hockey players become eligible for the 
professional draft, and must decide whether to enter the draft or attend college. Nocera, supra 
note 73.. 
 80. Id. For the benefits of choosing NCAA hockey over a junior league like the CHL, see 
NCAA College Hockey vs. CHL Major Junior, COLLEGE HOCKEY INC., http://collegehockeyinc. 
com/pages/ncaa-college-hockey-vs-chl-major-junior (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) 
 81. Nocera, supra note 73. 
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reclassified as professionals, there is not much money that the NCAA 
and its member institutions would have to share with them.
82
 
Studies have shown that college athletes, including those who 
have sued their universities and the NCAA, see themselves as 
athletes, not students. In Division I football, 59% of student-athletes 
reported that athletics was the primary reason for attending their 
college, as opposed to 24% who indicated academics.
83
 In men’s 
basketball and baseball, the numbers rose to 68% and 79% 
respectively.
84
 Additionally, 72% of Division I male student-athletes 
in sports other than football, baseball, or basketball, reported viewing 
themselves as more of an athlete than a student.
85
 Even 55% of 
Division III male student-athletes felt the same way, as did 64% of 
Division I female student-athletes.
86
 
Nearly every student-athlete dreams of playing professionally. 
According to Domonique Foxworth, former cornerback for the 
University of Maryland and the NFL’s Baltimore Ravens, and an 
executive committee member for the NFL Players Association, “even 
the second string punter believes a miracle might lift him to the 
NFL.”87  
Additionally, in those sports with extensive minor leagues and 
farm systems, namely hockey and baseball, players often attend 
college because they have been advised that it is their best route to 
 
 82. To conclude a discussion on the no-agent rule, it is worth noting that a court has 
rejected the rule. In Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009), the court 
permanently enjoined the rule prohibiting agents in all college sports because it violated the 
duty of good faith implicit in the contract between Oliver, a pitcher on the Oklahoma State 
University baseball team, and the university itself. Id. at 215. Moreover, the court found that the 
ban on agents “surely does not retain a clear line of demarcation between amateurism and 
professionalism.” Id. at 214. That ruling was later vacated by a settlement. Katie Thomas, 
N.C.A.A. to Pay Former Oklahoma State Pitcher $750,000, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/sports/09ncaa.html. While a vacated ruling from a state 
trial court is not terribly persuasive authority, it illustrates the problems with the no-agent rule 
and that it is possible to defeat the no-agent rule through legal argument. 
 83. Glenn M. Wong et al., Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to Student-Athletes 
in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553, 556 
(2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/. 
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the professional leagues.
88
 For these student-athletes, attending 
college is not a decision to further their education, but a decision to 
forego other paths to the professional leagues. 
This “path to the pros” mentality is particularly true for elite 
players in elite programs. For example, coach John Calipari runs a 
program at the University of Kentucky, which won a national 
championship in basketball in 2012 and entered the 2015 NCAA 
Tournament with a historic 34–0 record, that prepares college athletes 
for the NBA. Coach Calipari has admitted that all players are aware 
of their ratings as a professional prospect, and any coach that thinks 
his players do not worry about going pro is “out of [his] mind.”89 
With millions of dollars and the fulfillment of a childhood dream at 
stake, it is not surprising that many college athletes have the dream, 
and sometimes also the intent, to play professionally. 
College coaches have also brought an antitrust suit against the 
NCAA post-Regents and these suits have achieved more success than 
the suits by student-athletes. In Law v. NCAA, the court struck down 
an NCAA rule limiting the annual salaries of some coaches.
90
 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA had been unduly limiting price 
competition for the services of some coaches and the NCAA 
countered that the rule was, among other things, necessary to 
preserve amateurism in college athletics.
91
 Using a Rule of Reason 
analysis, the court found no procompetitive benefits to the rule, but 
rather that it was a “naked price restraint.”92 The court at that time, 
however, declined to extend their rationale to the amateur status of 
college athletes.
93
 
Since Law, NCAA coaches have become increasingly 
professionalized. “This is a business,” remarked football coach 
 
 88. Nocera, supra note 73.  
 89. Mike DeCourcy, Kentucky Coach John Calipari: “I’ve got maybe the best job in 
basketball”, SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 5, 2012, 11:03 AM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/ 
ncaa-basketball/story/2012-03-05/kentucky-coach-john-calipari-ive-got-maybe-the-best-job-in-
basketball. 
 90. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 91. Id. at 1022 n.14. The NCAA also argued that the rule was justified because it reduced 
the cost of a collegiate athletic programs and maintained competiveness between college teams. 
The court rejected both of these arguments on the merits. Id. at 1021–24. 
 92. Id. at 1020. 
 93. Id. at 1022 n.14. 
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Tommy Tuberville about his leaving one program and being hired by 
another.
94
 The salaries paid to the coaches of major college football 
and men’s basketball programs are on par with, and in some cases 
surpass, salaries paid to professional football and basketball 
coaches.
95
 In 2014, seventy-two college football coaches and thirty-
nine men’s basketball coaches made over $1 million each in total 
pay.
96
 The highest paid state employee in thirty-nine states is a 
college football or basketball coach.
97
 National media recently 
speculated that the University of Alabama and the University of 
Texas would get into a bidding war to hire Nick Saban, pushing his 
annual salary over $10 million.
98
 Many coaches profit further from 
their celebrity status by trademarking their names and signing 
separate licensing deals with their schools.
99
 Moreover, the salaries 
paid to college coaches far outstrip those paid to college professors, 
signaling that these coaches are valued beyond their contributions to 
their universities’ academic programs.100 
 
 94. See Josh Kendall, Tuberville Faces Firing Squad of Questions from Dan Patrick, 
COACHINGSEARCH.COM (Dec. 13, 2012), http://coachingsearch.com/article?a=tuberville-faces-
firing-squad-of-questions-from-dan-patrick. He also referred to college coaches as “CEOs” and 
“hired guns.” Id. 
 95. The highest paid NFL head coach, Sean Payton, earns roughly $8 million per year, 
while the highest paid NBA coach, Doc Rivers, earns $7 million per year. Chris Smith, The 
Highest-Paid Coaches in U.S. Sports, FORBES (May 22, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/chrissmith/2013/05/22/the-highest-paid-coaches-in-us-sports/. Steve Berkowitz et al., 
NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries (last visited Apr. 4, 
2015). 
 96. Id. The highest paid coaches, each running elite programs and winning multiple 
championships, are Nick Saban, the head football coach at the University of Alabama, whose 
total pay in 2014 was $7,160,187, and John Calipari, the head men’s basketball coach at the 
University of Kentucky, whose total pay in 2014 was $6,356,756. Id. 
 97. Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest-Paid Employee a Coach? 
(Probably), DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-your-states-
highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228. 
 98. Pat Forde, Could Texas Bidding War Make Nick Saban College Football’s First $10 
million Coach?, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:43 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/ news/ 
ncaaf--could-texas-bidding-war-make-nick-saban-college-football-s-first--10-million-coach--22 
4337644.html; see also Kevin Sherrington, Sherrington: If Texas Offers Alabama’s Nick Saban 
$10 million/year, He Should Listen, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 19, 2013, 9:43 AM), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/headlines/20130918-sherrington-if-texas-offers-
alabama-s-nick-saban-10-millionyear-he-should-listen.ece. 
 99. Steve Berkowitz, Latest Trend for College Football Coaches: Trademarked Names, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/11/ 
06/college-football-coaches-pay-name-likeness-trademarks/3449829/. 
 100. A fully-tenured professor at the University of Alabama earns an average annual salary 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/17
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Universities can afford high salaries for coaches because major 
college athletic programs generate high revenues for the schools 
involved. It is not unusual for the football team at a big-revenue 
football school to earn between $40 million and $80 million in profits 
each year.
101
 This category includes the Universities of Florida, 
Georgia, and Michigan, and Pennsylvania State University, among 
others.
102
 The University of Texas is the most valuable college 
athletic program, currently valued at $129 million overall, with a 
football team that generated $65 million for the university in 2012.
103
 
Notre Dame, the second most valuable program, generated more than 
$10 million in additional spending per home football game in 
2012.
104
 This class of universities operates major athletic programs 
that rake in tens of millions of dollars for their respective institutions.  
In addition to profits from university athletic departments, some 
universities run their own sports television networks and sign 
lucrative deals with corporate sponsors. The Longhorn Network, 
which broadcasts athletic content of the University of Texas, is the 
most prominent of these.
105
 On the corporate sponsor side, an 
example is Cam Newton’s 2010 season, when he won the Heisman 
Trophy and the National Championship while compliantly wearing at 
least fifteen corporate logos on his jersey and equipment as part of 
Auburn University’s $10.6 million deal with sports clothing maker 
 
of $132,900. 2013 AAUP Faculty Salary Survey: University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/aaup-survey-data-
2013/138309#id=100751. A fully-tenured professor at Duke earns an average annual salary of 
$180,200. 2013 AAUP Faculty Salary Survey: Duke University, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 
8, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/aaup-survey-data-2013/138309#id= 198419. Cf. Berkowitz, 
supra note 95. 
 101. Branch, supra note 87. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams: 1. University of Texas 
Longhorns, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/pictures/emdm45el/1-
university-of-texas-longhorns/. 
 104. Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams: 2. University of Notre Dame 
Fighting Irish, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/pictures/emdm45 
el/2-university-of-notre-dame-fighting-irish/. 
 105. Steven Godfrey, The Eye of Texas: Inside the Longhorn Network as it Continues to 
Enter Unchartered Territory, SB NATION (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.sbnation.com/longform/ 
2013/10/3/4798078/the-eye-of-texas-inside-the-longhorn-networks-uncharted-television. Many 
athletic conferences and a few other schools also operate their own television networks, such as 
the SEC Network, the Big Ten Network, the Pac-12 Network, and BYUtv. 
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Under Armour.
106
 While the student-athletes remain “amateurs,” the 
coaches occupy highly professional and well-compensated positions 
and the industry of college sports has become undeniably 
commercialized and profitable. 
The NCAA is not the only institution to espouse the idea of 
amateur athletics. The modern Olympic games once had an 
amateurism code that barred Olympic athletes from being paid for 
their participation in athletics or accepting commercial 
endorsements.
107
 However, driven by the lure of increased revenue 
and the fact that most Eastern Bloc athletes were already de facto 
professionals supported by their governments to train and compete 
full time, the International Olympics Committee abandoned the 
pretense of amateurism and allowed professional athletes to 
compete.
108
 The word “amateurism” was removed from the Olympic 
charter in 1974 and, over the next two decades, the International 
Olympic Committee slowly changed other rules and allowed 
professionals to compete.
109
 By the 1992 Barcelona Games, the 
“Dream Team” of NBA superstars represented the United States in 
Olympic basketball (and won gold), even though all played 
basketball professionally and accepted commercial endorsements.
110
 
While the athletes may have changed, from amateur to professional, 
the nature of the Olympics as a product did not change: the Olympic 
spirit of international camaraderie through sport remains and the 
games are more popular now than ever.
111
   
 
 106. Branch, supra note 87. Notably, Under Armour also recently agreed to pay $90 
million over ten years for the right to clad Notre Dame athletes in Under Armour equipment 
and produce Notre Dame athletic apparel; Adidas has a similar ten year deal to pay $82 million 
to the University of Michigan. Darren Rovell, Under Armour Signs Notre Dame, ESPN.COM 
(Jan. 21, 2014, 3:06 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/ 10328133/notre-dame-
fighting-irish-armour-agree-most-valuable-apparel-contract-ncaa-history. 
 107. Bob Greene, What Changed the Olympics Forever, CNN (July 23, 2012, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/22/opinion/greene-olympics-amateurs/. 
 108. Id. 
 109. MARIE-HÉLÈNE ROUKHADZÉ, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., THE OLYMPIC WINTER 
GAMES: FUNDAMENTALS AND CEREMONIES (2002), available at http://www.olympic.org/ 
Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_267.pdf.  
 110. Greene, supra note 107. 
 111. Hruby, supra note 5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Unnecessary Roughness 365 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
Amateurism is no longer a viable procompetitive justification for 
the NCAA’s mutual restraints of trade because (1) college sports are 
not amateur; (2) amateurism is not procompetitive, as the NCAA 
claims; and, (3) there are less restrictive alternatives than amateurism 
to maintain the product that is college sports. 
A. College Sports Are Not Amateur 
First and foremost, college sports are not amateur. While many, if 
not all, coaches and players participate because they love the sport or 
their school, college athletics is also a business. 
Second, major college football and basketball programs represent 
major commercial, as opposed to academic, endeavors. Many 
generate profits in the tens of millions of dollars.
112
 They operate 
television networks to disseminate content and sell advertising.
113
 
They enter into contracts with manufacturers of sporting goods that 
adorn college athletes in corporate logos.
114
 These commercial trends 
do not degrade the product of college sports; if anything they make it 
more accessible to the public. The investments in and revenues 
generated by the athletics programs in a class of major universities 
indicate, however, that athletics at these universities has moved 
beyond being a mere component of the academic programs and 
educational mission.
115
 
 
 112. Branch, supra note 87. 
 113. See Godfrey, supra note 105. 
 114. See Rovell, supra note 106; see also Branch, supra note 87. 
 115. Some contend that the academic side of college athletics is, itself, a sham because of 
the special help given to some college athletes (e.g., tutors, less demanding coursework, and 
leniency from professors not available to the general student body) and the low academic 
achievement by some athletes (e.g., low test scores and low graduation rates). However, the 
statistics to support this argument are incomplete, often because the schools and the NCAA 
refuse to share the necessary information. The evidence remains largely anecdotal. See Sara 
Ganim, CNN Analysis: Some College Athletes Play Like Adults, Read Like 5th-Graders, CNN 
(Jan. 8, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/us/ncaa-athletes-reading-scores/ 
index.html. 
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Second, the salaries of major college coaches far outstrip those of 
professors at the same university.
116
 This discrepancy indicates that 
these coaches are valued for more than their contributions to their 
universities’ academic programs (though as a leader and mentor, a 
coach likely has impact in this area as well). A university with a 
major athletic program wants a coach that does more than simply 
teach a sport and life skills to athletes. These schools want a coach to 
win championships, garner prestige for their programs, and ultimately 
increase the demand for their product (college sports) in the eyes of 
sponsors, broadcasting networks, and fans. If intercollegiate athletics 
was truly an integral subcategory of a university’s scholastic mission, 
then competition for coaches would not drive their value so far above 
that of the ‘other’ educators: college professors.  
Coaches and schools can and do profit from college athletics,
117
 
license their names and likeness,
118
 and accept endorsement deals.
119
 
Athletes, on the other hand, are barred from all of these activities. 
The stringently enforced amateur status of the athletes themselves is 
arguably the only thing about major college sports that is actually 
amateur. 
Third, despite the amateurism rules and their enforcement, those 
same college athletes do not see themselves as amateurs. Across 
sports, genders, and levels of competition, a majority of student-
athletes attended their institution because of athletics, not 
academics.
120
 Moreover, every athlete is aware of his or her prospects 
of rising to the top professional league in the sport.
121
 Those with 
good prospects often play college sports to get to these leagues.
122
 For 
many college athletes, college athletics is not a part of a larger 
scholastic experience, but rather a stepping-stone on the road to the 
NFL, NBA, or NHL. For coaches and schools, it is a business. 
 
 116. See, e.g., 2013 AAUP Faculty Salary Survey: University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa, 
supra note 100. 
 117. Branch, supra note 87; see also Berkowitz et al., supra note 95. 
 118. Berkowitz, supra note 99. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Wong et al., supra note 83, at 556. 
 121. See DeCourcy, supra note 89. 
 122. See Nocera, supra note 73. 
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B. Amateurism Has No Procompetitive Effects 
Despite NCAA claims, amateurism is not procompetitive. That is, 
the amateurism restraints do not create a different product that would 
otherwise be unavailable.
123
 In theory it is difficult to say that a 
student-athlete with a little money in his pocket would be any less of 
a student or that he would be different from a student who worked his 
way through school with a nonathletic job. Moreover, observers of 
college sports have noted that the popularity of college sports is more 
closely tied to location and university than to the idea that such sports 
are amateur.
124
 
In practice, where amateurism restraints have been neglected or 
abandoned the product has not changed. First, the success of the 
hockey system indicates that lifting the ban on agents in other sports 
would not change the nature of the product that the NCAA and its 
members license to broadcasters.
125
 Second, the Olympics abandoned 
the pretense of amateurism decades ago and have not become a 
lecherous, money-grubbing hive of villainy.
126
 The ideals of the 
Olympic spirit endure and demand for the Olympic product is higher 
now than ever. Likewise, nothing suggests that college sports would 
change or that universities and student-athletes would be worse off 
should all college sports abandon amateurism.  
C. Less Restrictive Alternatives to Amateurism 
Lastly, there are less restrictive alternatives than the current 
system of amateurism rules and enforcement. A simple and elegant 
alternative can be found by looking to the Olympics: lifting the 
prohibition on endorsements.
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 This alternative keeps the nature of 
 
 123. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984). 
 124. See Hruby, supra note 5. Bluntly, “Alabama fans want Alabama wins. Not an 
association-imposed Alabama player salary cap.” Patrick Hruby, Court of Illusion, SPORTS ON 
EARTH (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/62747894/. 
 125. See Nocera, supra note 73. 
 126. See Hruby, supra note 5. 
 127. This approach is also endorsed by the National College Players Association (NCPA), 
a fledging but largely unrecognized trade association for college athletes. The NCPA has urged 
Congress to adopt the Olympic model because the NCPA believes that a system that allowed 
college athletes to “secure endorsement deals, get paid for signing autographs, etc.” is 
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the product intact because schools still would not issue direct 
payments to athletes for playing, it solves many of the problems 
presented by direct payments, and it offers a scheme that is far less 
restrictive of the rights of college athletes. 
The most pressing dilemmas with direct pay for college athletes 
concern the amounts of the payments and to whom they will be paid. 
Would schools be obligated to disburse a small blanket payment to 
all athletes? Or would the payment only go to those in revenue 
sports? Would a school that paid only its football and men’s 
basketball players violate the anti-gender-discrimination provisions 
of Title IX? Do superstars get paid more by the school than average 
athletes? Do schools need to start contract negotiations with recruits? 
Would direct pay from the school unacceptably divide the athletes 
from the rest of the student body? Some of these concerns are more 
valid than others, but none are at issue if college athletes are simply 
allowed to accept endorsements.  
Under a system where endorsements are allowed, the market 
would decide who gets paid and how much. Superstar college 
athletes would accept larger endorsements from national brands, and 
other players would accept smaller endorsements from local 
businesses. Ideally every athlete would be able to profit from 
athletics in a way directly tied to the value of his or her name.
128
 
Schools could treat all athletes equally and not occur any additional 
costs to the school. Additionally, student body cohesiveness would 
remain unaffected because, from the perspective of other students, 
college athletes would simply join the many other college students—
the writer who receives royalties from a book she published, the actor 
who gets paid to do commercials, or the waiter who works on the side 
to pay tuition—who receive payments from a third party outside the 
university. Similarly, relationships between teammates, coaches, and 
 
preferable to the NCAA’s impractical and unjust amateurism rules. RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. 
STAUROWSKY, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE 
SPORT 26, available at http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/The-Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-
Sport.pdf.  
 128. For example, a talented, prolific, and well-known quarterback could sign a deal with 
Nike or Under Armour and appear in a nationally disseminated advertising campaign, while a 
lesser-known player could endorse regional businesses like Belk or promote local events. Under 
such a system, it would be that business that pays the athlete, not their school or the NCAA.  
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athletic departments would also not suffer were athletes allowed to 
accept endorsement deals. These relationships would continue to 
function, much as they do as the professional level, where all athletes, 
coaches, and managers have—sometimes wildly—different earning 
potential, but still collaborate toward their common goal.  
Keeping all other rules in place but allowing college athletes to 
accept endorsements is a small change that leaves schools and the 
product of college sports unchanged. But it is far less restrictive of 
the rights of college athletes to contract and to profit from the use of 
their image and likeness. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Because amateurism is no longer a viable procompetitive 
justification, courts should reject this proffered justification and rule 
against the NCAA in O’Bannon on appeal.  
The NCAA can likely escape antitrust suits from college athletes 
without suffering any financial loss by lifting the prohibition on 
endorsements. Though the NCAA’s potential antitrust liability likely 
would remain as a technical matter (i.e. the NCAA would still be 
price-fixing the value of an athlete’s labor), few athletes would file 
suit because commercial endorsement would provide an easier path 
to compensation than suing the NCAA. Also, any athletes that did 
pursue antitrust claims against the NCAA would likely find that the 
ability to seek endorsements makes it more difficult for them to prove 
an injury to themselves, essential to any antitrust claim,
129
 from the 
NCAA’s restraints. If the athletes are getting paid, a court will have 
difficulty finding a redressable injury from the amateurism restraints. 
This path would also alleviate much of the perceived unfairness and 
hypocrisy that surrounds amateurism and the treatment of college 
athletes.  
 
 129. See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Amateurism is no longer a viable procompetitive justification for 
the NCAA’s mutual restraints of trade because college sports are not 
amateur, amateurism is not procompetitive, and there is a viable 
alternative that is far less restrictive of the rights of college athletes. 
Whether the NCAA voluntarily relaxes the amateurism rules or a 
federal court forces the issue, the NCAA’s heavy-handed regulation 
of the amateur status of college athletes is likely to come to an end.
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 130. The NCAA has arguably seen the proverbial writing on the wall and begun to 
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